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Abstract In this paper we evaluate the current account patterns of China and
Germany. We point out that China’s current account surplus as a share of
global GDP in recent years resembles that of Germany’s. Yet, an important
difference is that the Euro block’s current account inclusive of Germany has
overall been balanced, whereas emerging Asia’s current account inclusive of
China has mostly been characterized by sizable surpluses. We further find that
both China and Germany’s current account surpluses seem to be accounted for
by common factors. However we have reasons to doubt the long run viability
of these current account trends in future decades. Demographic transitions in
China and Germany are projected to reduce their surpluses, and this effect is
stronger for Germany. We also discuss plausible reasons to doubt the extent to
which the Euro block will move towards significant surplus in the coming
years.
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“Let me introduce you to Chermany, a composite of the world’s biggest net
exporters: China, with a forecast current account surplus of $291bn this year
and Germany, with a forecast surplus of $187bn. … Both also believe that
their customers should keep buying, but stop irresponsible borrowing. Since
their surpluses entail others’ deficits, this position is incoherent. Surplus
countries have to finance those in deficit. If the stock of debt becomes too big,
the debtors will default. If so, the vaunted “savings” of surplus countries will
prove to have been illusory: vendor finance becomes, after the fact, open
export subsidies.”
Martin Wolf, “China and Germany Unite to Impose Global Deflation”
Financial Times, March 16, 2010.
The great recession has brought into focus the sizable current account surpluses of
China and Germany, leading some observers to align the two into a unified block
sharing similar agenda. At times of low unemployment in the OECD countries (as
has been the case during the Great Moderation), observers viewed current account
imbalances as win-win arrangements, promoting the export led growth of China and
reducing the cost of funding the deficits of the US [see Dooley et al. (2003)]. During
the Great Recession, observers occasionally link the current account surpluses of
China and Germany as a growing challenge for other OECD countries.1 The purpose
of our note is to evaluate the current account patterns of China and Germany in
context of the global imbalances, and to discuss the future prospects of the
continuation of these surpluses. We start by reviewing the current account patterns of
these two countries during the last 30 years. Thereafter, we evaluate their current
account patterns in context of regional and global imbalances. We then conduct an
empirical analysis of the possibility that common global and domestic factors
account for the current account patterns of both countries, and finally conclude with
an assessment of future trends.
From a quick inspection of the data, China seems to be the new Germany rather
than the other way round. Indeed, Germany has been running significant current
account surpluses during most of the 1980s, reaching 5% of its GDP in the mid
1980s, at a time when China experienced current account deficits, reaching −4% of
its GDP in the mid 1980s [see Fig. 1]. Germany’s current account moved towards a
balanced position during the 1990s, possibly reflecting the fiscal challenges
associated with unification with East Germany. On the other hand China’s current
account stance changed from closed to being balanced (in the first half of the 1990s),
to surpluses ranging between 2% and 4% of its GDP, during the second half of the
1990s. Intriguingly in the 2000s, the patterns of the current accounts of China and
Germany became highly correlated, moving in tandem, from about 2% to nearly
10% of their respective GDPs in 2006, and dropping to 6% of their GDPs in 2008.
1 To exemplify, in Dealing With Chermany, Krugman articulated “So here’s where we are: China has done
nothing to change its policy of massive currency manipulation, and its exports are surging. Meanwhile,
Europe is going wild for fiscal austerity. Angela Merkel says that budget cuts will make Germany more
competitive—but competitive against whom, exactly? …everyone is counting on the US to become the
consumer of last resort, sucking in imports thanks to a weak euro and a manipulated renminbi.” New York
Times blog (June 11, 2010).
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Figure 3 suggests that an obvious common external factor was ‘accounting’ for the
current account patterns of Chermany: the US current account deficit.2
Figure 1, focusing on the current account to GDP ratio, overlooks the fact that
size matters. Small countries play a minor role in global imbalances, independent of
their current account to GDP ratios [see Aizenman and Sun (2010)]. The big story of
the last 30 years has been the sustainable, high growth rate of the Chinese economy.
From a small economy close to autarky in 1980, China has now become a major
trader of goods and services, and a key player in the context of global imbalances.
This is vividly illustrated by tracing the current account patterns of China and
Germany in USD billions, in Figs. 2 and 3. It is worthwhile to note here that until
1994, the contribution of China to global imbalances was pratically nil. China’s
current account surplus accelerated from 2000s onwards, surpassing that of Gemany
in 2007, thereby confirming the point that, if at all, China is the new Germany. The
remakable acceleration of current account surpluses of China took place at a time
when trade openness of China, which was about one-third of Germany in the early
1980s, reached that of Germany in 2000s [see Figs. 4 and 5].3
A look at the regional patterns reveals an obvious difference between Germany
and China. Germany has been the anchor of exchange rate of the core of Western
Europe before and after the formation of the Euro. Figure 3 shows that during the
last 30 years the average current account of the Euro block was close to a balanced
3 The correlation coefficients between the current accounts (in USD) of China and Germany between 1980
and 1994 and 1995 and 2009 were, −0.29 and 0.93 respectively. Furthermore, the correlation coefficients
between current accounts (in USD) of China and USA between 1980 and 1994 and 1995 and 2009 were,
0.48 and −0.61 respectively. The correlation coefficients between current accounts (in USD) of Germany
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Fig. 1 Current account to GDP ratios of China and Germany
2 Over the last decade (2000–2009) the correlation coefficients between US current account and the
current accounts of China and Germany were, −0.42 and −0.81 respectively.
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position. Thus, as long as the Euro block is viable, and its current account is closed
to being balanced, concerns about the German current account surpluses happen to
be more of an European issue, rather than a global imbalances issue. It is fair to say
that Europe has been quite a neutral block in terms of its net contribution to global
imbalances, and most of the balancing of the current account deficits of the US
during the 2000s was done by East Asia and the oil and commodity exporting
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Fig. 3 Countries’ current account balance as percentage of World GDP
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absence of pro-active leverage regulations contributed to the real estate and asset
appreciations in the US. Ironically, Germany seems to play the role of China within
the Euro block, de facto financing deficits of other euro-block members, probably
magnifying the credit boom in Europe.
Arguably, in the short-intermediate run, the choices of the exchange rate regime
and the degree of financial integration affect patterns of current account and the
speed of adjustment of current account imbalances. During 1950s–1960s, prior to
the formation of the Euro, sustaining the de facto fixed exchange rate in the core of
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Fig. 4 Ratio of exports to GDP of China and Germany
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harmonization in the years leading to the Euro, the credibility of the macro policies
implemented by the core of Western Europe, and the optimism regarding the Euro
project during the Great Moderation induced under pricing of sovereign debt of non-
core Euro zone countries at times of deeper financial integration [see Giavazzi and
Spaventa (2010) and the references therein]. The growing current account surpluses
of Germany in 2000–2007, and the presumption that the core of the Euro zone
would help in times of need, facilitated cheaper funding of current account deficits
of non-core Euro zone countries. The net outcome has been rapid increase in cheap
credit, magnification of the appreciation of real estate and other assets in several
European countries [including Ireland and Spain],4 and consumption boom
[including Greece and Portugal]. These dynamics are consistent with the Austrian
View of financial crises [see Bordo and Wheelock (2004) and Dellas and Tavlas
(2010)]. When monetary policy passively allows bank credit to expand, financial
imbalances (possibly magnified by current-account deficits in the open economy),
fuel the appreciation of assets, increasing the odds of a financial crisis down the
road.
In contrast, China maintains stringent capital controls, and has been de facto part
of the dollar block—a block that seems to be characterized during the 2000s by
sizable current account surpluses of China, moving in tandem (but in opposite
direction) with the current account of the US. China’s limited financial integration
and financial repression enhanced its ability to sustain an overall stable yuan/dollar
rate at times of growing current accounts surpluses. These surpluses have been
absorbed by accelerating hoarding of international reserves, and massive steriliza-
tion. Capital controls and the financial repression in China imply that the costs of
sterilization in China have been lower than they would have been otherwise, leading
observers to regard the induced undervaluation of the yuan as a factor contributing to
the Chinese export performance.5 These patterns were dubbed by Dooley et al.
(2003) as Bretton Woods II.
1 Data Analysis
Against this background, we evaluate the patterns of the current account to GDP
ratios of China and Germany, as a function of lagged conditional variables in a panel
analysis, for 1970–2009 [see Tables 1 and 2]. The relatively short duration of our
sample constrains our approach, and hence we sequentially add lagged conditioning
variables to a bivariate regression. The set of controlling variables is mostly from
4 Pre 2008–09 data supports the notion that current account deficit, controlling for other relevant factors,
was the most important conditioning variable accounting for real estate appreciation (Aizenman and
Jinjarak (2009)).
5 In the 2004 Jacobsson Lecture, Summers articulated “A substantial number of countries are maintaining
a fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate through very substantial exchange rate intervention and enjoying
strong export performance to the United States as a result.” Note that the ultimate current account surplus
is explained by the saving minus investment of a country [or its export minus imports], and can be
accounted by multitude of factors. The relative weakness of the Yuan reduces the real income of Chinese
labor, and thereby their imports. Furthermore, the shallowness of the safety net in China implies that rising
income uncertainty and declines in the pension replacement ratios explain the high private saving rate in
China [see Chamon et al. (2010)].
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Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Gruber and Kamin (2007). See the Appendix for data
sources. To avoid correlation with the dependent variable, we lag the conditioning
variables. The controls are:
– The US current account, reflecting the possible impact of the US as the
demander of last resort. Larger US current account deficits are expected to be
associated with a more positive current account balance of other countries.
Table 2 Estimation of China’s current account/GDP
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Constant −0.39 −0.62 −0.15 2.47 −5.10* 0.32 −1.64 2.39** −0.30
−0.80 −0.70 −0.68 −6.50 −2.95 −1.13 −1.41 −0.91 −0.44
Observations 38 32 32 32 32 32 29 32 32
R-squared 0.38 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.77
Given the relatively high correlation between China’s NFA and US current account deficit (−0.8), we exclude US current account
as well as world growth rate from column (3) onwards i.e. when China’s lagged NFA to GDP ratio is incorporated.
The dependent variable is current account balance scaled by GDP of China. The table shows time-series estimation results from
ordinary least squares regression over the period from 1970 to 2009, using lagged, annual values of all explanatory variables.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
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– World and domestic GDP growth rates. An increase in the growth rate relative to
other countries should be associated with a more negative current account
balance, as it tends to be correlated with higher return on capital, increase in
investment and the potential for higher future income, and decreases savings.
– Country’s net foreign asset position (NFA), expressed as a ratio to GDP. Higher
Country’s NFA position increases its net investment income, and therefore tends
to improve its current account balance.
– Government budget balance. Higher fiscal surplus (or lower fiscal deficit) tends
to improve current account balance.
– Demographic factors (old and young dependency ratios). To recall, the life-cycle
theory of consumption and saving implies that young households borrow,
middle-age households save for retirement, and households in retirement dis-
save. Therefore relatively young and relatively old countries are more likely to
run current account deficits [see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 3)]. These
effects may be captured empirically by controlling for youth dependency ratio
(the ratio of the population ages 0–14 to the working age population, ages 15–64),
and old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of the population 65 and older to the
working age population).
– Domestic credit to GDP ratio (to proxy for domestic financial depth), and trade
openness. Lack of financial development and lack of trade openness limit
investment opportunities and hence encourage capital outflows [see Prasad et al.
(2006) and Chinn and Prasad (2003)].
We also estimate the current account patterns of China and Germany by applying
the Seemingly Unrelated Regression [SUR] Model, for 1970–2009 [see Table 3].
One result that is common to all our estimations is the key importance of a
common global factor—the US current account. In the SUR model, the current
account/GDP surpluses of China and Germany are found to be moving in tandem
with the US current account/GDP deficits, with a coefficient that is close to one.
This implies that a rise in US current account/GDP deficit by 1% is associated with
an equal rise of the current account/GDP surpluses of China and Germany. The





Lagged US current account/GDP −0.96*** (0.21) −0.96** (0.14)
Lagged own growth rate 0.05 (0.04) −0.04 (0.04)
Lagged world growth rate 0.01 (0.07) 0.20*** (0.08)
Constant −0.60 (0.83) −1.64*** (0.59)
Observations 38 38
R-Squared 0.41 0.60
The dependent variable is current account balance scaled by GDP of China and Germany respectively. The
table shows time-series estimation results from a seemingly unrelated regression model over the period
from 1970 to 2009, using lagged, annual values of all explanatory variables. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
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growth rate of the global GDP seems to be playing an important role for Germany,
but not for China. These results are in line with the key role of the US as the
demander of last resort during our sample period.6
2 Future Trends: Discussion
The dominance of the US as the spender or demander of last resort before the crisis,
and the importance of the global growth rate in accounting for the surpluses of
Germany hints at the limited viability of large future current account surpluses of
China and Germany. This may especially be the case if the drop in US current
account deficit/GDP ratio endures beyond the crisis period. In the global
equilibrium, the sum of all current accounts should add up (up to statistical
discrepancy) to zero. Hence, focusing on the creditors as the source of the challenges
facing the global economy overlooks the contribution of the US itself to global
imbalances. Similarly, focusing only on the debtor(s) would overlook the need for all
parties to move from the pre-crisis state of affairs to the post-crisis one.
There are reasons to expect that the pre-crisis trends may be unsustainable. To
recall, in 2000–2007, the US current account deficit/GDP was about 4–5%, funded
partially by Chinese surpluses of about 8–10%, and significant current account
surpluses of oil exporters, and few other countries. Looking forward, demographic
factors are likely to impose important balancing effects on future current account
trends.
Figures 6 and 7 suggests that future demographic transitions would work towards
narrowing the surpluses on China and Germany. During the next 30 years, the
dependency rate of the old (the ratio of population aged 65 years and older to the
working age population aged 15–64 years) in Germany and China would increase
dramatically relative to the US. The dependency ratio of the old in the German and
Chinese population is projected to increase during 2010–2035 by about 24% and
19%, respectively, whereas that of the US would increase by 14%. The dependency
ratio of the young (the ratio of population aged 65 years and older to the working
age population, aged 15–64) in Germany is projected to increase by 2%, whereas
that of the US and China are predicted to go down by 4% and 2%, respectively.
These trends may work towards mitigating the surpluses of China and Germany.
Table 4 summarizes the projected changes in the dependency rates, and their
projected marginal contributions, applying the regression results of Gruber and
Kamin (2007). The demographic transitions of China and Germany in the next
25 years are projected to reduce their current account/GDP by about 2.5% and 3.5%,
respectively. This effect is stronger for Germany, reflecting the greater increase in the
old dependency rate in Germany. These adjustments tend to be front-loaded, as the
old dependency ratio curves in Figure 7 follow logistic patterns, and hence this
process is likely to kick-in early on. The demographic transition in the US is
6 The limited number of observations (not more than 38) forced us to add sequentially the other
conditioning variables (see Tables 1 and 2). Adding the extra conditioning variables does not change the
main results described above. Due to limited degrees of freedom, we do not focus on the signs and the
significance of the other conditioning variables.
396 J. Aizenman, R. Sengupta
projected in increase US current account deficit/GDP by 2%. Consequently, the
projected demographic transitions in China and Germany would reduce their current
account surpluses, mitigating their contribution to global imbalances. In contrast, the
projected demographic transition in the US would increase US current account
deficit, suggesting that demographics would not mitigate the need of the US to
increase its net savings.
While projecting future GDP growth rates may be subject to larger standard errors
than projecting demographic trends, most observers expect the growth rates of China
and other emerging markets to exceed that of the US and the OECD countries by a
large margin. This trend has important repercussions on the future global
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Fig. 7 Projections of dependency ratios (Old)
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embarking on an export led growth, like China in the 1970s, can sustain it without
imposing negative ripple effects as long as its relative size remains small. However,
the long run success of the Chinese growth strategy may put in motion forces that
may curtail the sustainability of a high GDP growth rate and a large current account
surplus path. By now, China has reached a critical mass of “an elephant
running in a China store.” The continuation of the fast growth rate of China,
while maintaining large current account surplus/GDP, would be conditional on
the sustainability of larger current account deficit/GDP of countries that grow at
a much slower rate. This can be illustrated by investigating the size distribution
and the durability of current account deficits, and by a simulation that relies on
the adding-up property of current account balances, which, up to statistical
discrepancies, should sum-up to zero.
Aizenman and Sun (2010) found that, with the exception of the US, the duration
of spells of current account deficits during the decades prior to the 2008–09 global
crisis depended negatively on the relative size of a country, as measured by its GDP/
World GDP. The continuation of the pre-crisis path of the Chinese GDP growth rate,
exceeding 10% a year while sustaining a current account/GDP ratio of 10% would
require overtime, large increases in the current account/GDP ratios of large players,
like the US. Short of the emergence of a new demander of last resort, one may
reasonably expect the unwinding of global imbalances in the coming years. This
follows the observation that the US is already facing deleveraging “stabilization
blues.” The housing market weaknesses and the resultant private sector deleveraging
point to probable reduction of consumption and increase in saving, thereby curtailing
US current account deficits [see Glick and Lansing (2009)]. Similarly, the Greek
crisis has put in motion forces reinforcing belt-tightening in Southern Europe.
Coupled with this, the differential attitude towards fiscal policy of the core of
Western Europe, i.e. of France and Germany, suggests that Europe may not be eager
to replace the old role of the US as the global demander of last resort. EU’s tendency
to run on average, balanced current accounts remains an issue that deserves further
exploration. Arguably, this may reflect the greater political bargaining clout of labor
in Europe relative to the US. In circumstances when current account deficits are

















China −0.04 0.001 0.19 −0.026 −0.024
Germany 0.02 −0.001 0.24 −0.032 −0.033
USA −0.02 0.001 0.14 −0.019 −0.018
The projected changes in dependency ratios (young and old) are from the United Nations World Population
Database. The predicted marginal impact on the current account/GDP for each country is based on Gruber and
Kamin (2007), regression (1) in Table 2. They found that the marginal effects of young and old dependency
ratios are −0.03 and −0.13, respectively. To illustrate, an increase of the old dependency ratio by 0.24 is projected
to change the current account by −0.13*0.24=- 0.032, reducing surpluses (or increasing deficit) by about 3% of
the GDP
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driven by balance of trade deficits, labor may oppose larger deficits to mitigate
downwards wage pressure.7
The unwinding of global imbalances may be facilitated by a gradual shift of
China from export led growth, towards a balanced growth of internal demand, a
strategy that may be consistent with the continuation of Chinese employment and
GDP growth [see Feenstra and Hong (2010)]. In addition to this, the continued rise
in global GDP share of emerging markets may provide a further impetus for Asian
countries to switch towards heavier reliance on policies boosting domestic demand.
This in turn suggests the presence of market forces that may induce China and other
emerging markets to scale down their current account surpluses over time. Thus, we
may expect that short of the emergence of a “new demander of last resort” replacing
the US, the Chinese growth path would be challenged by the limited appetite for
prolonged current account deficits of most countries, and Europe would continue
running close to balanced current accounts.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
7 Verifying this argument needs further research. To recall, an accounting tautology indicates that the
current account surplus is saving minus investment, and is also equal to the value of goods produced by
domestic residents, including net factor income and net transfers from abroad less the expenditure of
domestic residents on goods. This implies that, on average, large current account deficits
are associated with aggregate demand of domestic residents that exceeds their aggregate supply, a gap
that is funded by net borrowing. The data indicates that the average saving/GDP in recent decades differs
sharply between the US and the EU, while the patterns of investment/GDP are similar. During 2000–2007,
the average investment rates of the EU and the US were about 20% of GDP (20.5% and 19.7%,
respectively), yet the gross saving rate of the EU exceeded that of the US by a wide margin (19.71%
versus 15.4% of GDP). Similar patterns apply for 1980–2007 [investment rates of the EU and the US were
21.2% and 19.6%, respectively, whereas the gross saving rates were 19.6% and 16.7%, respectively].
Some of these differences may be attributed to the deeper safety net of Europe, financed by much higher
consumption taxes in Europe than in the US [see Lindert (2003) for insightful overview of the taxation and
safety net differences between the EU and the US, summarizing his two books on this topic], and the
under-taxation in the US relative to the size of US government demand and its transfers. Underpinning the
political economy factors that may account for these differences remains an open research agenda.
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